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ABSTRACT
We develop a New Keynesian model featuring Calvo price setting
and Calvo wage setting to quantify the welfare consequences of
shifting trend inflation in Vietnam. To capture the characteristics
of the Vietnamese economy, we use the Simulated Method of
Moment and calibrate parameters jointly to match the important
selected moments of Vietnamese data. The results show a severe
consequence of a constant positive trend inflation and an
exogenous shock to trend inflation, especially when a central
bank sets a high level of inflation target. Among staggered price
and wage contracts, the latter play a vital role in transmitting the
adverse impacts of constant and shifting trend inflation into the
economy. Based on our analyses, raising inflation targets would
seem to be a bad policy prescription in Vietnam.
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Vietnam has experienced periods of unstable inflation in the past. In recent years,
bad signals in the world market, such as an upsurge in the prices of commodity and
petroleum, have raised concerns regarding potential substantial rises in future infla-
tion in Vietnam. In addition, the implementation of Vietnamese monetary policies
aiming to control these issues seems to be inconsistent and ineffective, which has
partly contributed to a more substantial rise in inflation. All are expected to bring
about serious consequences.
To model the substantial rise in inflation, many authors, such as Kozicki and
Tinsley (2001), Ireland (2007), Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009) and Nakata
(2014) have employed a highly persistent trend inflation process to depict slow
changes in implicit inflation targets1 set by a central bank. This adoption implies a
lack of commitment to a fixed inflation target or a tendency of the central bank to let
inflation rise. By using this idea, authors show the necessity for studies on shifting
trend inflation2, for example, the study illustrating the implications for the term
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structure of interest rate by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), that on the consequences for
output and inflation by Ireland (2007), the research on implications for the predict-
ability of inflation by Cogley et al. (2009), and the study on welfare consequences by
Nakata (2014). However, the literature has mostly considered one form of rigidities -
the sticky-price model with shifting trend inflation. Just recently, authors have con-
sidered other forms of rigidities to quantify welfare costs. In particular, Ascari,
Phaneuf, and Sims (2018) incorporated staggered wages into the medium-scale model
to quantify the welfare costs of constant trend inflation. They argue that constant
trend inflation magnifies the inefficient utilization of labor, then produces more siz-
able welfare costs. Ha, Thanh, and Thang (2019) also emphasizes the important role
of staggered wage contracts in transmitting the effects of trend inflation. However,
the welfare consequences of shifting trend inflation, a salient property of developing
countries, have not been fully exploited.
The present study fills the gap in the literature by exploiting the welfare costs of
exogenous variation in trend inflation in Vietnam. In this paper, trend inflation is
interpreted as a central bank’s target inflation rate and we model it as a highly per-
sistent AR(1) process. The focus is paid on the Vietnamese economy for the following
reasons. First, the idea of shifting trend inflation is suitable for Vietnam because of
its inconsistent and ineffective policy implementations during the 1996–2015 period.
Table 1 reports changes in monetary policy targets as well as the difficulties in achiev-
ing them. Second, the actual data in Vietnam also indicate a time-varying and highly
persistent property of trend inflation, especially during the financial crisis. Figure 1
clearly shows shifts in mean values or trend inflation (the red line) over time. To
quantify the welfare consequences of shifting trend inflation, we first use a bench-
mark model -a standard New Keynesian model with Calvo price setting- to compare
the welfare between an economy with zero and positive variance of shocks to trend
inflation. Subsequently, additional analyses are conducted by considering a different
price setting behavior to point out the welfare cost differences stemming from ineffi-
cient allocations of resources and physical adjustment costs; a higher-order approxi-
mation to check the accuracy of the second-order approximation; a robust check for
parameters, and a model with both staggered price and wage contracts.
We model the characteristics of the Vietnamese economy by using the Simulated
Method of Moment (SMM) for the quarterly data in Vietnam during the 1996Q1-
2015Q4 period and make a robust check by calibrating the parameters jointly to
match the important moments of the Vietnamese year data during the 2005–2016
Table 1. Monetary policy targets and performance in the period 2000-2015.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Inflation Target 6 < 5 3-4 < 5 < 5 < 6.5 < 8 < 8
Perform 1.7 -.04 3.8 3.2 7.8 8.3 7.4 8.3
Output Target 5.5-6 7.5-8 7-7.3 7-7.5 7.5-8 8.5 8 8.2-8.5
Perform 6.8 6.89 7.08 7.34 7.79 8.44 8.23 8.46
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inflation Target <10 < 15 7-8 <7 <10 8 7 5
Perform 23.1 7.1 8.9 18.7 9.1 6.59 4.09 0.63
Output Target 8.5-9 5 6.5
Perform 6.31 5.32 6.78
Source: Author’s computation from the data of State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), and Annual Report of SBV.
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period. The inconsistency of the time period stems from the unavailability of quar-
terly data for consumption and labor supply in Vietnam-these yearly data have only
been available since 2005. Selected moments, closely related to dynamic behavior of
consumption and labor supply, are important for welfare cost computations, which
are the main exercise of the paper.
With these considerations, we show that the consequences of constant and shifting
trend inflation are severe, especially when a central bank sets a high inflation target
level. The evidence is more obvious if we adopt the model with staggered price and
wage contracts. Among two channels, the staggered wage contracts play a crucial role
in transmitting the impacts of constant and shifting trend inflation into the economy.
Our conclusion in the case of developing country is aligned with Ascari et al. (2018),
who conducted a similar exercise in the U.S. In the present study, we provide add-
itional evidence for the role of staggered wage contracts in the welfare consequences
of shifting trend inflation. The welfare consequences in Vietnam are more severe
than those in developed countries due to parameter value differences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We outline the literature review in
Section 2 and the extended model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 explains how to
compute welfare and welfare costs. Estimated parameters are presented in Section 5
while Section 6 and Section 7 show the main results and results of further analyses.





















































































































Figure 1. Vietnam CPI inflation: 1996Q1-2015Q4 (annualized quarter-to-quarter percent changes).
Source: GSO. The red lines are the average of inflation in different periods.
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2. Literature review
A log-linearization around the zero inflation steady state is the popular approach in
the existing literature3. The approach is convenient because it can produce a simple
and tractable model but wash out some implications of the microfoundations4 and
can lead to misleading conclusions. Realizing the limitations, Ascari (2004) and
Bakhshia, Khanb, Burriel-Llombartc, and Rudolf (2007) make substantial changes in
the short-term and long-term properties of model based on the Calvo staggered price
model with trend inflation. In particular, Ascari (2004) studies the impulse response
of output to the money-growth shock with various levels of trend inflation to analyse
the effects of trend inflation on output persistence, while the effects of non-zero infla-
tion on the slope of the NKPC are investigated by Bakhshia et al. (2007). The early
contribution of Ascari (2004) and Bakhshia et al. (2007) are building blocks in the lit-
erature for the latter researchers to exploit diverse implications of non-zero and then
shifting trend inflation.
Regarding welfare analysis, this paper is related to two strands of the literature.
First, it is related to the literature on non-zero trend inflation. The plurality of models
has so far adopted the sticky-price model with positive trend inflation, such as
Ascari,(2004), Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007), Ascari and Ropele (2009), and
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). These papers show that a less-than-4-percent
trend inflation rate has a minor impact on the economy. In particular, Ascari (2004)
finds that an additional steady-state output loss of 0.5 percent is created when
increasing trend inflation from 2 to 4 percent, while the compensation-equivalent
welfare loss is less than one percent, as found in Amano, Moran, Murchison, and
Rennison (2009). By contrast, Ascari et al. (2018) study a medium-scale model with
staggered prices and staggered wages to show significant welfare costs of constant
trend inflation. They also emphasize the role of staggered wage contracts on
these costs.
The other strand is related to the model with shifting trend inflation. By employ-
ing the second perturbation approximation method suggested by Kim, Kim, Sims,
and Schaumburg (2008), Nakata (2014) attempts to quantify the welfare consequen-
ces of shifting trend inflation. In his model, he argues that the negative impacts of
exogenous variations in trend inflation are transmitted into the economy solely by
the staggered price contracts. With this consideration, he shows the trivial welfare
costs of shifting trend inflation. In this study, we follow an approach similar to
that used in Nakata (2014) to measure the welfare consequences of shifting trend
inflation. However, we incorporate an additional channel that trend inflation dis-
torts the relative allocation of labors across households through a staggered wage
contract, as discussed by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), thus causing changes
in welfare. By matching the important moments of Vietnam, we argue the welfare
consequences of inconsistent policy implementation for the case of develop-
ing countries.
Previously, many authors argue that raising inflation targets would seem to be a
bad policy prescription. On the policy front, the significant welfare costs of trend
inflation present a warning against policy proposals requiring central banks to raise
their inflation targets. This policy implication is aligned with those of Ascari and
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Sbordone (2014) and Ascari et al. (2018). However, these results might conflict with
the fact that central banks target a positive level of inflation, around 2 percent per
year. The discussion against targeting a zero or a low rate of inflation is the Zero
Lower Bound (ZLB, henceforth) constraint. In particular, Summers (1991) discusses
that with a very low average inflation rate, the central banks might encounter limita-
tions of conducting an effective stabilization policy since this policy requires non-
negative real interest rates and nominal rates. The need for a negative real rate of
interest when there exists the zero lower bound would be accommodated by an infla-
tion target ranged from 1 to 3 percent as argued by Summers (1991) and Fischer
(1996). Krugman (1998) raises a similar point when he argues that an inflation target
of 4 percent for several years in Japan is necessary to generate the negative real rates
and curb deflation.
In recent years, economists have emphasized on the likelihood and consequences
of hitting the ZLB, for example, Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2011), and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012). They argue
that raising the inflation targets could reduce the costs related to the ZLB as well as
the probability of hitting the ZLB. Moreover, the literature has so far advocated a
higher inflation target, which is realized by a temporary increase in expected inflation
instead of a permanent increase in the long-run inflation objective. To generate the
expectation of higher inflation, the key is the commitment to a history-dependent
policy as argued by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Coibion et al. (2012), and
Ascari and Sbordone (2014). The commitment to the future policy can decrease the
current real interest rate and provide economic stimulus. Without the commitment
to a history-dependent policy, it would be more likely to emphasize the costs of posi-
tive trend inflation.
3. Model
The model is populated by four classes of agents: the household indexed by j 2 ½0, 1;
the final-goods producing firms; a continuum of intermediate-goods producing firms
indexed by i 2 ½0, 1; and the government.
3.1. The household
In the benchmark model, households maximize their expected discounted present
value of future period utility with respect to a given budget constraint. Their period
utility function can be separated into two components: consumption ðCtÞ and work-
ing hours ðHtÞ as given
X1
t¼0
btð ln ðCtcCt1Þ x1þ tH
1þt
t Þ, (1)
where b and c denotes the discount factor and the habit formation parameter, which
are restricted as 0<b<1, 0  c<1: t is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The flow budget constraint is represented as
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PtCt þ BtRt ¼ Bt1PtTt þWtHt þ Dt: (2)
Equation (2) shows the different sources of households’ income. Households earn
WthtðiÞ by providing htðiÞ units of labor to each intermediate-goods producing firm
i 2 ½0, 1 at the beginning of each period. They also receive a nominal profit, Dt,
because they own the intermediate goods, and receive the lump-sum government
transfer, Tt. They then decide to use their income in different ways. During each
period t, households purchase consumption goods, Ct, from the final-goods produc-
ing firms at the nominal price, Pt. They also purchase the one-period bond, Bt, from
the intermediate-goods producers at the price 1=Rt as a saving. Therefore, households
choose labor supply, ht, bond holding, Bt, and consumption, Ct, to maximize the life-
time utility, subject to the budget constraints.
3.2. The Final-Goods producing firm
Final-goods producing firms maximize profits by using constant-return-to-scale tech-
nology. In order to manufacture Yt units of final products, they employ YtðiÞ units of








¼ Yt , (3)
where hp is the price elasticity of demand for intermediate goods. The profit maxi-

















Since the competitive final-goods firms have zero profit in the equilibrium, the








3.3. The Intermediate-Goods producing firm
A continuum of intermediate-goods producing firms, indexed by i 2 [0 1], hire
htðiÞ units of labor from households to produce Yt units of intermediate goods (i)
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during the period t. They employ constant-returns-to-scale technology, which can
be written as:
ZthtðiÞ ¼ YtðiÞ: (7)
The logarithm of aggregate technology shock, Zt, follows a stationary stochastic
process:
ln ðZtÞ ¼ qZ ln ðZt1Þ þ Zt , (8)
where Zt is the serially uncorrelated innovation, which has a normal distribution
with mean zero and standard deviation rZ. We assume that the intermediate-goods
producers set nominal prices as in a staggered Calvo price fashion. According to
Calvo (1983), a fixed fraction, gp, of firms, which cannot re-optimize their nominal
prices, still set their prices according to the indexation rule. The way those firms reset




where vp and lp are a degree of price indexation and the relative weight on lagged infla-
tion, respectively. The inflation, pt, is defined as
Pt
Pt1
and pt is interpreted as the central
bank’s inflation target. The fraction (1gp) of firms, on the other hand, are able to set




























if s¼ 1,2,3,… , kt is the same as the Lagrangian multi-
plier on the household’s budget constraints, and Wt denotes the nominal wage.
3.4. Authority’s policy
3.4.1. Monetary policy
The authority sets the short-term nominal interest rates following a Taylor rule. In
particular, the rule allows for interest rate smoothing and interest rate responses to
deviations of inflation from the central bank’s inflation target and deviations of out-
put from the steady state:
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where R,y are the steady state of Rt and Yt, respectively. The parameter qR illustrates
the degree of interest rate smoothing. Rt is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
The evolution of trend inflation is described as a persistent AR(1) process as:
ln ðpt Þ ¼ ð1qp Þ ln ðpÞ þ qp ln ðpt1Þ þ pt , (13)
where q
p
denotes the degree of shock persistence and pt is a standard normally dis-
tributed shock that is independent of time.
3.4.2. Fiscal policy
The public spending is given by
Gt ¼ 1 1gt
 
Yt , (14)
where gt is an exogenous disturbance following the stochastic process
ln ðgtþ1Þ ¼ ð1qgÞ ln ðgÞ þ qg ln ðgtÞ þ gt , (15)
where 11gð Þ represents the steady-state value of government spending relative
to output.
3.5. Market clearing condition
The market clearing condition in the labor market, the goods market and the bond




Yt ¼ Ct þ Gt , (17)
Bt ¼ 0: (18)
4. Welfare and welfare cost computation
Following Nakata (2014), we also use the perturbation method to compute the
approximation to the policy functions around the deterministic steady-state, and use
these to compute the welfare. We decompose the welfare into the three different












btMuðxÞE xtx½  þ
X1
t¼0
btNuðxÞE ðxtxÞ  ðxtxÞ½ 
¼ Ud þ Ul þ Uv,
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where xt ¼ ½Ct,Ct1,Ht; and MuðxÞ and NuðxÞ are vectors that contain the first and
second derivative of u(.) evaluated at x, which are the deterministic steady state of xt.




level component, Ul ¼
P1
t¼0 b























where CA, t ,HA, t are consumption and labor supply in the economy with rp>0 and
CB, t ,HB, t, are consumption and labor supply in the economy with rp ¼ 0:
5. Estimation
5.1. Data
The system involves three observable variables, including output growth ðgyt Þ, infla-
tion ðptÞ and short-term nominal interest rate ðrtÞ: This study uses quarterly
Vietnamese data collected from 1996Q1 to 2015Q4. The raw data are taken from the
database available at the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) and the
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Seasonally-adjusted figures for real GDP,
which are converted to GDP per capital by dividing by the total population, serves as
a measure of output growth. Quarterly changes in seasonally-adjusted figures for
Consumer Price Index and quarterly lending rate yield the measure of inflation and
nominal interest rate, respectively. Regarding the yearly data, we collect figures for
the private consumption, the number of employment and the government expend-
iture during the 2005–2016 period. All data are de-trended prior to the estimation of
the model.
5.2. Simulated method of moment estimates
Following Ruge-Murcia (2012), the present study uses the Simulated Method of
Moment (SMM). By using this method, we minimize the weighted distance between
the empirical moments and the moments computed from the artificial data.
The model parameters are separated into two subsets. The first subset includes
fixed parameters that are fixed prior to the estimation Table 2 shows the parameter
values of this subset. We set the discount factor (b) and the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor supply (t) to 0.99 and 3.00, respectively. Regarding the production sector,
the degree of indexation (v) and the weight on lagged inflation (l) are set to 0.00
and 1.00, as argued by Cogley and Sbordone (2008)5. The elasticity of the substitution
parameter for differentiated intermediate goods is set to 10. We also set the probabil-
ity of not being able to optimize (gp) to 0.65 and then we let this value change to
observe differences in welfare consequences. The share of government expenditure to
output is set to its respective sample mean.
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The second subset includes the remaining parameters for the persistence level
and volatility level of monetary shock (qR and rR), technology shock (qZ and rZ),
and shock to trend inflation (q
p
and r
p ), the Taylor coefficients on inflation (/p) and
output growth (/y). Table 3 reports the SMM estimated parameters based on the
second-order approximate solution for the Vietnamese data. The null hypothesis that
each estimated parameter does not differ from zero is statistically rejected at 5 per-
cent significance level. Regarding a shock to trend inflation, although previous work,
such as Ascari and Sbordone (2014), Cogley et al. (2009), Fuhrer and Moore (1995)
and Fuhrer (2010) holds the consensus on the high persistence of trend inflation, its
exact magnitude still remains debated, especially considering the time-varying trend
inflation in developing countries. Table 3 shows that the persistence of trend inflation
is close to 0.995 and statistically significant at 5 percent.
Regarding the coefficients of Taylor rule, this study shows a fairly high persistence
of monetary shock. Furthermore, the obtained parameters imply that the central bank
responds considerably to the inflation gap, but weakly to the output gap. These
results are consistent with Hieu (2012). Moreover, the monetary shock volatility is
smaller than that of the shock to trend inflation (Figure 2).
5.3. SMM impulse responses
The top panel of Figure 2 shows a decrease in consumption and labor supply in
response to a one-standard deviation increase in the monetary policy shock.
Moreover, reductions in both output and inflation are also attributed to the monetary
policy shock, as expected by the theory in the bottom panel of Figure 2. A higher
magnitude of change, such as a two-standard deviation increase in exogenous
Table 2. Fixed parameters.
Parameter Description Value Target
p Steady-state inflation 1:020:25 Two percent infl.steady state
b Discount factor 0.99 Standard value
t Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 3.00 Standard value
c Consumption habit 0.80 Standard value
h Elasticity of substitution 10.0 Standard value
v Degree of Indexation 0.00 Cogley & Sbordone,(2008)
l Weight on lagged inflation 1.00 Cogley & Sbordone,(2008)
G / Y Government expenditure share 0.22 Sample Mean
Source: Author’s calculation and collection from previous papers.
Table 3. SMM estimates.
Parameter Description Estimated Value S.e.
qR Monetary shock persistence 0.8102 0.0004
qZ Technology shock persistence 0.7999 0.0005
qp Shock to trend inflation persistence 0.9949 0.0000
100rR Monetary shock volatility 0.0024 0.0063
100rZ Technology shock volatility 0.0099 0.0024
100rp Shock to trend inflation volatility 0.0007  0.0022
/p Taylor coefficient on the inflation gap 2.4234 0.0003
/y Taylor coefficient on the output gap 0.5000 0.0001
Note: S.E. is a standard error. The superscripts  denote that for the null hypothesis the true parameter value is zero
and rejected at the 5 percent significance levels.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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monetary policy shock, signifies changes in the respective macroeconomic variables.
The converse happens when considering a negative exogenous shock.
It is essential to analyze the consequences of inconsistent policy implementation
for the shock to trend inflation. The top panel of Figure 3 provides some implica-
tions to explain how the shock to trend inflation leads to welfare distortions. In
particular, a one-standard deviation increase in exogenous shock to trend inflation
leads to a decrease in consumption but a rise in labor supply. These opposite
trends tend to expand over time. In addition, we also investigate the macroeco-
nomic effects of exogenous shock to trend inflation in the bottom panel of
Figure 3. A diminishing of output growth and a rise in inflation are explicit conse-
quences of the shock to trend inflation. From the results, it can be seen that
Figure 2. Dynamic responses to a monetary shock. Source: Authors’ calculation.
Figure 3. Dynamic responses to a shifting trend inflation shock. Source: Authors’ calculation.
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ignoring the positive constant and time-varying property of trend inflation may
lead to serious consequences.
6. Welfare and welfare cost results
This study firstly conducts exercises to observe the welfare effects of exogenous shock
to trend inflation6. Moreover, we perform additional analyses to make some robust
checks of some issues, such as a different price setting behavior, the accuracy of the
second-order approximation, alternative parameters, and different nominal rigidities.
6.1. Welfare cost of constant positive trend inflation
6.1.1. Results
Table 4 compares the economy with a 0-annualized-percent level and a 6-annualized-
percent level of trend inflation. When a central bank changes its inflation targets
from 0 percent to 6 percent, it leads to a high welfare cost (3.14%) compared to the
results in Lucas’s study. The results suggest that the sudden change in inflation tar-
gets might cause severe welfare consequences in developing countries like Vietnam. A
welfare cost due to a higher level of trend inflation mainly stems from changes in the
level component (from -0.25 to -4.94), while changes in the deterministic component
and volatility component are negligible(from -211.06 and -1.50 to -212.11 and -2.16,
respectively). The economic properties reflected by the steady-state values, mean val-
ues, and volatility values of consumption and labor supply in Table 4 provide explan-
ations for welfare differences between two economies. A reduction in the steady-state
and mean values and a rise in the volatility values of consumption and leisure are
sources of welfare distortions when a central bank sets up a constant positive level of
trend inflation. The results are aligned with those of Amano et al. (2007) and Nakata
(2014). The top panel of Figure 4 represents changes in welfare costs with respect to
a rise in the trend inflation level and the bottom panel provides reasons to explain
these changes. A given amount of rise in trend inflation causes welfare costs to grow
non-linearly.
Table 4. Welfare costs of constant trend inflation.






Steady-state C 0.82 0.81





Note: () expressed as percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state. Ud, Ul and Uv are the deterministic
steady-state, level and volatility components, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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6.1.2. The cost of price dispersion
The Calvo mechanism creates a price dispersion term, which generates a wedge
between output and hours to cause welfare distortions. The wedge, however, is sensi-
tive to trend inflation, i.e. it induces differences when trend inflation is positive and
disappears when trend inflation is zero. In this section, we argue that positive trend
inflation affects the steady-state price dispersion to create the cost of price dispersion.
The steady state of price dispersion is represented as follows:
sðpt Þ ¼ 1g1 gptð1vÞh }







It can be seen that the steady-state price dispersion increases corresponding to an
increase in g, h, and pt whereas a reduction of price indexation ðvÞ leads to an
improvement of price dispersion. More intuitively, if the price is entirely flexible ðg ¼
0Þ, there is no price dispersion, sðptÞ ¼ 1: On the other hand, a greater level of sub-
stitution elasticity leads to a growth in price, due to more inefficient allocations
among firms. More importantly, a rise in constant positive trend inflation drives the
steady-state price dispersion up by inducing a gap between the price set by re-setting
firms and the average price level, and this results in an inefficiency loss in aggregate
production. Finally, a decrease in steady-state price dispersion can be explained by
price indexation since it implies that non-optimizing firms can catch up with price
changes by optimizing firms. Hence, a greater price indexation causes price to be less
dispersed at any inflation rate.
Following Damjanovic and Nolan (2010) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014), this
study also measures the cost of price dispersion, expressed as ~zt ¼ ztst , which is a
measure of effective aggregate productivity and maps a percentage increase in price
Figure 4. Welfare costs of constant positive trend inflation. Source: Authors’ calculation.
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dispersion into an equivalent percentage. Figure 5 illustrates that trend inflation leads
directly to a reduction in effective aggregate productivity. Furthermore, a rise in price
stickiness and elasticity of substitution or a fall in price indexation causes effective
aggregate productivity to diminish. This is due to the way in which these parameters
impact the steady-state price dispersion, as discussed above. These effects, then, are
magnified when trend inflation reaches a higher level. In short, trend inflation can
impact the cost of price dispersion in both direct and indirect ways.
6.1.3. Determinacy regions
In this section, the paper examines the effects of changes in trend inflation on the
ability of the monetary authority to guarantee a determinacy region and macroeco-
nomic stability. As argued by Woodford (2003), a given increase in inflation, intui-
tively, requires a greater proportional rise in the nominal interest rate, inducing a rise
in the real interest rate. As a result, a drop in output is recorded via the Euler equa-
tion to curb the initial growth of inflation via the NKPC. Figure 6 illustrates the
determinacy region in the space of the policy parameters ð/y,/pÞ: The left-hand side
to the right-hand side of the top panel of Figure 6 correspond to changes in the
determinacy region when trend inflation is 0, 4, and 8 percent. The bottom panel
represents changes in the determinacy region when trend inflation increases.
For the interest rate rule, the determinacy region narrows rapidly with a rise in
trend inflation. Visually, the determinacy region shrinks because the two lines gov-
erning the generalized principles rotate when trend inflation increases. Hence, a
weaker policy toward output gap and a stronger policy toward inflation are required
simultaneously to guarantee the determinacy region. Consistent with previous studies,
Figure 5. The cost of price dispersion. Source: Authors’ calculation.
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for example, Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014), the monetary
policies that respond more to deviations of inflation from the target and less to the
output gap are preferred in order to ensure the determinacy region in the higher
inflation rate regime.
6.2. Welfare cost of shifting trend inflation
Table 5 compares the economy with zero variance of shocks to trend inflation and
the economy with positive variance of shocks to trend inflation. In both economies,
we set a positive level of trend inflation but this exercise differs from the previous
one by assuming the time-varying variance of trend inflation. The results show a
lower welfare in the economy with shifting trend inflation compared to the economy
with constant trend inflation. The welfare differences come mainly from a reduction
in the level and volatility component, whereas the deterministic component remains
unchanged. In this exercise, we also report changes in the properties of economies to
explain the sources of the welfare costs of shifting trend inflation. Both mean con-
sumption and leisure tend to decrease, while the economy becomes more volatile,
reflected by its higher volatility levels due to a positive variance in shocks to trend
inflation. The welfare cost is 0.13%, which is slightly larger than the result of Nakata
(2014), who performed the same exercise to explain the persistently high inflation
during the Great Inflation period in the U.S. In his study, Nakata also performs the
sensitivity analysis to show that the welfare costs of trend inflation are contingent on
Figure 6. Determinacy region and trend inflation.
Note: The determinacy region is expressed by the red area.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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the values of relevant parameters, such as the degree of price indexation, the fre-
quency of price adjustment, the level of trend inflation and the persistence and vari-
ance level of shocks to trend inflation. Because we employ SMM for the Vietnamese
data to obtain the different parameter values, these partly explain the welfare cost dif-
ferences between our study and Nakata’s.
7. Additional analyses
7.1. A different price setting: Rotemberg quadratic price adjustment costs
This section investigates whether the aforementioned conclusions still hold with an
alternative price friction. For comparison purposes, we quantify the welfare costs of
constant and shifting trend inflation in the Rotemberg pricing model. As in Nakata
(2014), this analysis helps us to point out the differences in the welfare costs of infla-
tion stemming from the price dispersion, causing the inefficient allocation of resour-
ces and those stemming from the physical adjustment cost of changing prices. An
intermediate-goods producing firm (i) selects the prices to maximize the expected dis-
























where / is the parameter capturing the price adjustment cost. In this Rotemberg
model, we need to calibrate / such that the slope of the Phillips curve is the
same as those in the Calvo pricing model at zero trend inflation. By mapping /
in the Rotemberg model to g in the Calvo model, these two models imply an
identical form for the first-order approximated Phillips curve. Under the Calvo
Table 5. Welfare costs of shifting trend inflation.






Steady-state C 0.82 0.82





Note: () expressed as percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state. Ud, Ul and Uv are the deterministic
steady-state, level and volatility component, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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pricing with zero trend inflation, the first-order approximation Phillips curve is
presented as:
N̂t ¼ ð1gÞð1bgÞg ŵt þ bEtN̂tþ1, (23)
where N̂t ¼ p̂tvlp̂t1 and p̂ ¼ ln ptpt
 	
: Under the Rotemberg pricing with zero
trend inflation, the first-order approximation Phillips curve is given as
N̂t ¼ h1/ ŵt þ bEtN̂tþ1: (24)
Therefore, / needs to be set as:
/ ¼ gðh1Þð1 gÞð1 bgÞ : (25)
Accordingly, the values of / are [33,48,70,107] with respect to g ¼ ½0:6, 0:65, 0:7, 0:75:
Table 6 reports the welfare costs of constant and shifting trend inflation in the
Rotermberg model. An increase in trend inflation leads to a rise in the price adjust-
ment costs, then an asymmetric change in consumption and labor supply decisions.
Although conclusions in the two models are the same, the welfare consequences due
to constant and shifting trend inflation in the Calvo model are slightly larger than
those in the Rotemberg model.
7.2. A third-order approximation
In the following exercise, we conduct a robust check of the accuracy of the second-
order approximation by solving the model with a third-order approximation. We
extend the method of Kim et al. (2008) to quantify a third-order welfare. The results
do not indicate a significant quantitative difference between the second-order and
third-order welfare costs7 (0.13 percent versus 0.16 percent). By performing the
higher-order approximation, we have some evidence to confirm our results on welfare
Table 6. Welfare costs of constant and shifting trend inflation: Rotemberg model.
Constant Trend Inflation Shifting Trend Inflation
p ¼ 0% p ¼ 6% rp ¼ 0 rp>0
Welfare Cost 0.40% 0.08%
Welfare 211.21 212.02 212.76 212.92
Ud 211.06 211.74 211.14 211.14
Ul 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.32
Uv 0.0001 0.1220 1.45 1.46
Steady-state C 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82
Steady-state H 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05
E(C)() 0.0012 0.0012 0.0014 0.0026
E(H)() 0.0001 0.0001 0.00001 0.00001
100rC 0.01 0.08 1.66 1.67
100rH 0.70 0.71 1.69 1.69
Note: () expressed as percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state. Ud, Ul and Uv are the deterministic
steady-state, level and volatility component, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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costs. The third-order in the exercise, however, is computationally expensive, thus
not convenient for further analyses.
7.3. A robust check of parameters
To conduct a robust check of parameters, we use an alternative set of parameters that
are obtained from simulating the model to match the important moments of data.
We select four moments: the output volatility (rY); the consumption volatility(rC);
the labor supply volatility (rH); and the correlation between consumption and output
(corr(Y, C)). We choose these moments because they are closely related to the behav-
ior of consumption and labor supply, which serve for welfare consequence analysis8.
To obtain the information of these moments, we employ HP-filtered Vietnamese
yearly data for output, consumption, and labor supply during the 2005–2016 period9
instead of quarterly data for output growth, inflation, and short-term interest rate as
previously. Table 7 reports the calibrated parameters.
Table 8 compares the moments created by the calibrated model with the moments
computed by the data. In general, the calibrated model is remarkably good at match-
ing the selected moments, thus can provide an adequate laboratory for subsequent
welfare analysis.
Table 9 represents the welfare costs and dynamic properties of the economy due
to constant and shifting trend inflation. In general, all conclusions in the previous
exercise remain the same. However, welfare costs of constant and shifting trend infla-
tion from using the recalibrated parameters are larger. These results might suggest
that the changes in implicit inflation targets set by a central bank might be a serious
problem in the case of developing countries like Vietnam.
7.4. A model with staggered price and wage contracts
7.4.1. Model expansion
In the literature, Ascari et al. (2018) show the more sizable welfare costs of constant
trend inflation in the medium-scale DSGE model, incorporating both staggered price
and wage contracts. In this section, we examine whether staggered wage contracts are
an important channel through which shifting trend inflation distorts the economic
welfare more significantly in Vietnam. We follow Erceg et al. (2000) to expand the
benchmark model by assuming that there is a fraction, gw, of households who cannot
freely set their wages but still can update their wages as follows:
Table 7. SMM estimates.
Parameter Description Calibration
g Probability of not being able to optimize 0.7400
qR Monetary shock persistence 0.8500
qZ Technology shock persistence 0.9300
qp Shock to trend inflation persistence 0.9950
100rR Monetary shock volatility 0.0025
100rZ Technology shock volatility 0.0110
100rp Shock to trend inflation volatility 0.0008
/p Taylor coefficient on the inflation gap 2.2000
/y Taylor coefficient on the output gap 0.4000
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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WtðjÞ ¼ ðplwt1p1lwt ÞvwWt1ðjÞ: (26)
















Table 12 in Appendix A lists all the calibrated parameters that we use for welfare
cost computation in this exercise. In this exercise, we assume a fair probability of
non-optimization for prices and wages so that gp and gw, are calibrated at 0.69. In
the exercise of quantifying the welfare costs of trend inflation, Ascari et al. (2018)
also set similar values for these parameters. We also assume a fair degree of price and
wage indexation (0.5). Table 10 compares the moments generated by the parameter-
ized model with the moments computed by the data. The reported volatility and cor-
relation statistics are for the HP-filtered Vietnamese data during the 2005–2016
period. In general, the key features of the data are matched reasonably well by the
calibrated model.
Table 8. Moments.
rY rC rH qðY , CÞ
Data 0.006 0.020 0.014 0.86
Calibration 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.80
Note: moments in the first row are obtained from HP-filtered Vietnamese data (2005-2016) while the second row is
the moments from simulations for the calibrated model.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 9. Welfare cost of constant and shifting trend inflation: An alternative parameter set.
Constant Trend Inflation Shifting Trend Inflation
p ¼ 0% p ¼ 4% rp ¼ 0 rp>0
Welfare Cost 6.80% 0.59%
Welfare 213.94 228.16 214.66 215.88
Ud 211.06 211.75 211.25 211.25
Ul 0.69 11.67 1.04 2.12
Uv 2.18 4.73 2.37 2.50
Steady-state C 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82
Steady-state H 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05
E(C)() 0.005 0.090 0.0081 0.0165
E(H)() 0.0003 0.0053 0.004 0.009
100rC 2.03 2.99 2.11 2.18
100rH 1.77 2.24 1.96 1.96
Note: () expressed as percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state. Ud, Ul and Uv are the deterministic
steady-state, level and volatility component, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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7.4.3. Results
This section first represents the welfare costs of shifting trend inflation in the model
with nominal price and wage rigidities (General Case). Subsequently, we consider two
special cases: Case 1 - the model with staggered price contracts and completely flex-
ible wages (gp>0, gw ¼ 0); and Case 2 - the model with completely flexible prices and
staggered wage contracts (gp ¼ 0, gw>0), to analyse which channel is the most
important for the transfer of the impacts of constant and shifting trend inflation.
Table 11 reports the welfare consequences of constant and shifting trend inflation.
Regarding the costs of constant trend inflation, they are roughly 2.73%. In addition,
the welfare costs in the staggered price model (gp>0, gw ¼ 0) are highly trivial, com-
pared to the staggered wage model(gp ¼ 0, gw>0). By adopting the similar model
with staggered price contracts, Ascari (2004), Amano et al. (2009), and Nakata (2014)
also show the modest cost of constant trend inflation. The greater cost in the model
with staggered wage contracts suggests that the staggered wage mechanism plays a
vital role in transmitting the impacts of varying trend inflation levels into the econ-
omy. This argument is consistent with those of Ascari et al. (2018).
Regarding the welfare costs of shifting trend inflation, we provide striking results
in this analysis. The welfare costs of shifting trend inflation in the model with stag-
gered price and wage contracts are fairly high (0.25%). Comparing two special cases,
the welfare costs of shifting trend inflation in the model with staggered wage con-
tracts are remarkably higher than those in the model with staggered price contracts.
The results reporting modest costs of shifting trend inflation in the model with nom-
inal price rigidities are consistent with Nakata (2014). Our study emphasizes the role
of staggered wage channel, through which exogenous variations in trend inflation sig-
nificantly distort welfare.
8. Conclusions
This paper made its key contribution by exploiting the welfare consequences of shifting
trend inflation, a salient property of developing countries like Vietnam, by building a
New Keynesian model featuring a Calvo price setting. We used the Simulated Method
Table 10. Moments.
rY rC rH qðY , CÞ
Data 0.006 0.020 0.014 0.86
Calibration 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.85
Note: moments in the first row are obtained from the HP-filtered Vietnamese data (2005-2016) while the second
row is the moments from simulations for the calibrated model.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 11. Welfare cost of constant and shifting trend inflation.
Welfare Cost(%)
Constant Shifting
General Case (gp>0, gw>0) 2.73 0.25
Case 1 (gp>0, gw ¼ 0) 0.28 0.06
Case 2 (gp ¼ 0, gw>0) 2.17 0.16
Source: Authors’ calculation.
574 L. T. HA ET AL.
of Moment proposed by Ruge-Murcia (2012) to jointly calibrate parameters to match
important moments of the Vietnamese data. Additional analyses such as the different
price setting behavior, the higher order of approximation, the other parameter set, and
the role of staggered wage contracts were performed to conduct robust checks on our
arguments. Our results show that the consequences of constant positive trend inflation
and shocks to trend inflation are severe, especially when trend inflation is high. Among
the two channels, staggered wage contracts play a vital role in transmitting the adverse
impacts of constant and shifting trend inflation in a developing economy.
The results of this study have crucial implications for both policy makers and
economists. Based on the preceding analyses, raising inflation targets would seem to
be a bad policy prescription. On the policy front, the significant welfare costs of con-
stant positive and shifting trend inflation present a warning against policy proposals
requiring central banks to raise their inflation targets.
Notes
1. Trend inflation can be interpreted as the central bank’s target inflation rate.
2. In other words, trend inflation is assumed to be positive and is more likely to shift
upward and downward over time.
3. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, (2000), Gali, (2002), Woodford, (2003) and among others.
Furthermore, Woodford, (2003) and Goodfriend and King, (2009) argue that many
specifications of the New Keynesian framework have the 0-percent long-run inflation.
4. Theoretically, some effects produced from the interaction of trend inflation, relative prices
and the monopolistic competition framework like price dispersion, marginal mark-up (the
ratio of newly adjusted price to marginal cost) and discounting (if firms discount the
future more, they less likely worry about an erosion of future mark-up) are eliminated by
the zero-steady-state inflation.
5. The research by Cogley and Sbordone, (2008) is the only paper that estimates the
parameters of Calvo model permitting imperfect indexation and shifting trend inflation. In
the literature, no-optimizing firms are commonly presumed to perfectly index their prices
to a weighted average of past inflation and steady-state inflation so that the level of trend
inflation does not affect the dynamics of the economy (Nakata, 2014).
6. We use Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s toolbox for a second-order and third order
approximation to policy rules. The codes will be provided by the author upon request.
7. The detailed results and codes will be provided by the authors upon request.
8. In our study, welfare costs can be defined as compensating variation in consumption that
enhances the welfare of a typical household in one economy to make them as well-off as
others in another economy.
9. In Vietnam, we have only collected the yearly data for consumption, and labor supply
since 2005.
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Appendix
A Parameters
Table 12. Calibration: model with staggered price and wage contracts.
Parameter Description Calibrated Value
b Discount factor 0.99
c Consumption habit 0.83
x Labor supply disutility 1.00
t Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1.00
1g1 Steady state share of Government expenditure 0.26
qZ AR(1) coefficient for technology shock 0.8
qg AR(1) coefficient for government spending shock 0.98
100rZ Standard deviation of technology shock 1.10
100rg Standard deviation of government spending shock 0.55
Monetary Policy
/p Taylor coefficient on the inflation gap 2.70
/y Taylor coefficient on the output gap 0.10
qR AR(1) coefficient for monetary shock 0.81
100rR Standard deviation of monetary shock 0.25
Calvo Price Setting
hp Price elasticity 10.0
gp Probability of not being able to optimize 0.74
vp Degree of price indexation 0.50
lp Weight on lagged inflation 0.50
Calvo Wage Setting
hw Wage elasticity 10.0
gw Probability of not being able to optimize 0.74
vw Degree of wage indexation 0.50
lw Weight on lagged inflation 0.50
Shifting Trend Inflation
p Steady-state level of trend inflation 1:020:25
qp Persistence level of shocks to trend inflation 0:995
100rp Standard deviation of shocks to trend inflation 0.08
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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